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‘Marx’ or the Market? Intra-party
Power and Social Democratic Welfare
State Retrenchment
GIJS SCHUMACHER
Differences in the intra-party balance of power explain variation in social democratic
responses to the economic crisis of the late 1970s. This article evidences this claim by
analysing the case of welfare state retrenchment by social democratic parties. Welfare
state retrenchment is electorally risky for social democrats and often contrary to their
principles. Therefore cases of welfare state retrenchment by social democrats provide
an excellent case study of the difficult trade-offs parties have to make between office,
policy and vote pay-offs. The article claims that leadership-dominated parties advance
office-seeking strategies and are therefore responsive to economic conditions and
public opinion. Conversely, activist-dominated parties advance policy-seeking
strategies and therefore support traditional social democratic policy platforms or
seek more radical solutions. By comparing seven social democratic parties (Denmark,
France, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the UK) between 1980 and
2005, this article explains variation in when social democrats introduced welfare state
retrenchment.
Introduction
In the early 1980s the Spanish (PSOE) and French socialists (PS) enacted
several welfare state retrenchment measures, steps which broke radically
with their rhetoric up to then. Under similar economic conditions the Dutch
(PvdA), British (Labour) and Danish (SD) social democrats refused to
retrench and continued with or strengthened their radical agendas. What
explains this variation in party responses to similar economic conditions?
This article examines welfare state retrenchment by social democrats to
explore party responses to economic conditions. Given the electoral risk of
retrenching popular welfare measures (Armingeon and Giger 2008; Giger
and Nelson 2011), and the risk of exacerbating inequalities (Kenworthy
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1999), which violates the core social democratic principle of egalitarianism,
it is puzzling that some social democratic governments have retrenched.
Welfare state retrenchment is defined in this paper as the commodification
of labour market arrangements, by, for example, deregulating labour
markets by reducing contract security to labour market outsiders, reducing
the level of unemployment benefits or implementing new rules that make
fewer people eligible for these benefits (e.g. Clasen and Clegg, 2007).1
The root cause of differences in party responses to similar conditions is
explained by variation in parties’ office-seeking and policy-seeking strategies.
To be more precise, the intra-party balance of power between office-
motivated leaders and policy-motivated activists explains which strategy a
party adopts (Marx and Schumacher forthcoming). Party leaders care about
maintaining or extending resources that bring office pay-offs (e.g. parliamen-
tary seats and proximity to potential coalition partners). Hence, they care
about economic performance, because a negative evaluation of the economy
may motivate voters to punish the government (Duch and Stevenson 2008).
To be perceived as effective economic managers, party leaders in government
should support measures that are expected to sustain electoral support. By
swapping principled policies for pragmatic policies, parties retain an image as
effective economic managers. However, such policy shifts may backfire when
credible opposition parties2 or unions mobilise against these measures. In that
case, the risk of losing votes because of opposition mobilisation becomes
greater than the risk of losing votes due to poor economic performance.
However, if party leaders face an internal party organisation in which
activists hold key veto-player positions, they cannot pursue pragmatic
policies because activists will veto measures that go against the party’s
principles. Hence, if intra-party organisation gives activists leverage over
party policy, the party becomes responsive to the preferences of these
activists. Therefore, I hypothesise that activist-dominated social democratic
parties stick to traditional social democratic dogma or become more radical.
To explain variation in when social democrats choose to enact welfare
state retrenchment measures, I analyse the interaction between the intra-
party balance of power and the selective responsiveness to environmental
incentives in a comparison of seven social democratic parties in the period
1980 to 2005. The analysis shows that parties (PS and PSOE) in which
leaders were dominant chose retrenchment measures immediately after the
onset of economic hardship. Under similar economic conditions, activist-
dominated parties (PvdA, Labour and SD) initially moved further to the
left. Over time, however, the agony of prolonged exclusion from office that
such parties (PvdA, Labour and SD) experienced and the subsequent failure
to implement their preferred policies altered the intra-party balance of
power and allowed party leaders to employ office-motivated strategies.
Finally, a third class of parties – German (SPD) and Swedish (SAP) social
democrats – are in-between cases in terms of the intra-party balance of
power and consequently became caught between modernisation and




































traditionalism, supporting retrenchment at times, but eventually reverting
back to more traditional social democratic politics.
By demonstrating that party responses to economic and political
conditions are conditional on the governing party’s intra-party balance of
power, this article has important implications for the qualitative and
quantitative literature on welfare states.
Social Democrats and Welfare State Retrenchment
The role of parties is a contentious issue in studies about welfare state
change. One view argues that welfare state change is determined by
economic conditions (e.g. Iversen and Cusack 2000; Wilensky 1975). As
such, parties have no or a limited role since they perfectly translate voter
preferences, which are determined by these economic conditions, into
government policy. However, other research indicates that parties do matter
because they have unique policy responses to similar economic conditions.
Ergo, social democratic parties as so-called agents of the working class
pursue the expansion of social benefits and worker protection (Castles 1982;
Huber and Stephens 2001; Korpi 1989). Here, varying levels of welfare state
generosity are primarily explained by the relative strength of social
democrats and other left-wing parties. These studies theorise and (mostly)
empirically validate that parties implement their ideological preferences.
This stream of research sees policy-seeking motivations for parties pursuing
welfare state change.
Today, few researchers hold purely deterministic views of welfare state
change. Arguably, the logic of welfare state politics has changed since the
late 1970s because of fiscal pressures to maintain a balanced budget or face
high inflation and currency speculation (Pierson 1996). Without the
possibilities of large-scale budgetary expansion, the left no longer expands
the welfare state. Neither the left nor the right will pursue retrenchment,
because party leaders believe they will be punished by an electorate that
supports the welfare state status quo (Giger 2011). The evidence for this
receding partisan effect is mixed. Some quantitative researchers find
evidence for a declining role of partisan differences (e.g. Huber and
Stephens 2001; Kittel and Obinger 2003), others find persistent partisan
differences with left-wing incumbency positively correlated to welfare state
generosity (Allan and Scruggs 2004; Amable et al. 2006; Korpi 2003).
Other studies argue that, while the agency of parties has not been totally
suppressed, it has becomemore complex. Most contemporary studies theorise
that a window of opportunity for welfare state retrenchment opens up when
the condition of electoral punishment is absent. In this case, parties can
retrench without the fear of electoral defeat. First, voters perceive social
democrats as a credible pro-welfare party and trust that what social
democrats do to the welfare state must be right, necessary or both (Levy





































retrenchment. Second, social democrats retrench in order to sustain acquired
privileges for their traditional core constituency, by, for instance, increasing
the insider–outsider divide by deregulating temporary forms of employment
while maintaining protection for regular workers (Rueda 2007). In this case,
only outsiders punish social democrats. Third, public opinion impacts on
policies (Burnstein 2003), and it did, arguably, account for an expansion in
welfare state spending (Brooks andManza 2006; but see Kenworthy 2009). If
there is a right-wing public opinion shift, perhaps caused by poor economic
performance, social democrats can gain voters by shifting with public
opinion. This explains why socio-economic problem pressure (e.g. unemploy-
ment) may translate into retrenchment (Vis 2009). Fourth, without a left-wing
competitor, left-leaning voters have no alternative party to cast a vote for
when the social democrats retrench (Kitschelt 2001). Fifth, similarly, a
coalition of pro-welfare parties (social and Christian democrats) can share the
blame for retrenchment and thereby limit the pro-welfare alternatives for
voters. This strategy helps to avoid punishment (Green-Pedersen 2002).
But these are office-seeking reasons that explain when social democrats
retrench. That electoral punishment is unlikely does not yet explain why
social democrats engage in retrenchment. In the 1980s the UK Labour Party
opposed a radical Conservative Party and faced no left-wing competitor. By
adopting a moderate policy stance, Labour could easily have won the
elections, but instead offered a radical left-wing programme. As will be
explained in the next sections, the Labour Party had powerful activists
whom prevented it from moving to a position from which it could win
elections.
In conclusion, researchers assume that parties are office-motivated or
policy-motivated. Assuming one or the other has repercussions for under-
standing welfare state retrenchment, because office-motivated parties are
responsive to different environmental incentives (economy, electoral context)
than policy-motivated parties (party activist pressure). To fully understand
the agency of parties, this paper operationalises policy motivations and office
motivations, by analysing differences in the intra-party balance of power and
how these differences affect the strategies parties choose.
Social Democrats and the Intra-party Balance of Power
Parties care about both policies and office (Müller and Strøm 1999).
Therefore, the (dis)utility of retrenchment for a party is the effect cutbacks
have on the sum of the party’s office and policy pay-offs.3 Parties enact
retrenchment measures if they believe that the measure will have a positive
effect on the party’s pay-offs. Not every party values office and policy pay-
offs to the same extent. Parties sometimes have to make hard choices
between policies that serve office goals and policies that serve ideological
goals. The intra-party balance of power determines this choice (Müller and
Strøm 1999: 14–16). At one extreme, policy-motivated activists may




































dominate a party because they occupy vital veto player positions within it.
As a consequence, these activists determine party policy. Activists invest
blood, sweat and tears into the party without immediate reward in terms of
income, prestige and rents. Hence, activists are policy-motivated (Müller
and Strøm 1999: 15–16). Activists are not necessarily more radical than
party leaders, yet they became politically active because of some positive
association with the core ideological mission of a party (Iversen 1994).
Classical social democratic ideology dictates high levels of generosity and
strong employment regulation. Hence, when party activists dictate party
policy it stays close to classic social democratic ideology (Hypothesis 1).
Hypothesis 1: If party activists are dominant, social democrats retain
social democratic policies.
At the other extreme party, leaders are dominant. The leader has an interest
in office, because it brings income, prestige and rents and therefore the party
seeks to optimise office pay-offs (Müller and Strøm 1999: 14). To obtain or
maintain office pay-offs, a party needs votes and, if necessary, coalition
partners. For the case of (office-seeking) social democratic parties, there are
two reasons to engage in welfare state retrenchment and one reason to
refrain from it.
First, theories of voting behaviour suggest that parties should take the
median position on issues that divide people (e.g. more or less welfare) and
strongly support issues that everybody agrees on (e.g. a good economy is
important) (e.g. Sanders et al. 2010). Figure 1 shows the mean voter position
on welfare spending and on government spending. Interestingly, the mean
voter in both countries consistently supports welfare state expansion and
government spending cutbacks over time. However, parties cannot do both at
the same time. Yet, in economic downturns, the saliency of the spending cuts
issue may triumph over the welfare spending issue because people fear the
direct effects of high inflation due to excessive government spending. In this
case, the median voter may accept the trade-off between budget cuts and
welfare state retrenchment. Economic downturns (i.e. rising inflation or
unemployment) or upturns also influence voters’ evaluations of the
government’s economic management skills. Since the economy is a valence
issue – an issue which everybody agrees that is important (Stokes 1963) –
leaders have an incentive to be positively associated with the issue. Hence,
poor economic performance may motivate voters to select a rival party in
which they have more faith (Duch and Stevenson 2008). To be perceived as
effective economic managers, party leaders opt for the adoption of pragmatic
measures that seem to maintain electoral support. By shifting policy towards
an arguably successful economic strategy, parties retain an image as effective
economic managers. Following issue-proximity voting logic and valence-issue
voting logic, severe economic conditions give office-seeking incentives to enact





































Second, in electoral systems with proportional representation (in this
sample, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden) parties need to
form multi-party coalitions. To gain access to office, social democratic party
leaders are forced to compromise with other, often centrist, parties on
various policy proposals. One such policy proposal might be welfare state
retrenchment. If a coalition with right-wing or centrist parties is negotiated,
social democrats may need either to accept retrenchment or to spend more
time in opposition.
Third, these motivations to retrench are counteracted by the risk of
alienating left-wing voters. Left-wing voters may decide to vote for a rival
party or abstain because the social democratic party’s policy preferences
FIGURE 1
MEAN VOTER POSITIONS ON WELFARE AND SPENDING FOR GERMANY AND
UK (1980–2006)
Source: ISSP, Role of Government I, II, III and IV (1985, 1990, 1996, 2006).




































are too far away or because it loses its image as protector of the working
class. If opposition parties or unions mobilise public opinion against a
social democratic government intending to retrench, this severely damages
the prospects of social democrats remaining in office (either by losing votes
or coalition partners or both). Schumacher et al. (forthcoming) demon-
strate that when voters become dissatisfied with social democrats enacting
welfare state retrenchment measures, they switch to a party that is equally
pro-welfare (left-libertarian parties, Christian democrats). Labour unions
are also instrumental in mobilising public opinion against social demo-
crats. However, if unions and opposition parties fail to mobilise public
opinion or are not credible, social democrats do not need to fear electoral
punishment and subsequent departure from office. Hence, in economically
troubled times, party leaders face a choice between losing votes for being
perceived as poor economic managers or for implementing unpopular
policies. If leaders come to believe that the impact of the economy on their
future office pay-offs is greater than the impact of credible opposition
mobilisation, then social democratic party leaders enact welfare state
retrenchment measures (Hypothesis 2). If there is no economic crisis or
credible opposition mobilisation, leaders refrain from enacting these
measures.
Hypothesis 2: If party leaders are dominant, the party enacts
retrenchment when the risk of losing office pay-offs due to economic
voting is greater than the risk of losing office pay-offs due to credible
opposition mobilisation.
The balance of power between leaders and activists may shift as a
consequence of the failure of certain strategies. Parties change if they fail to
achieve their goals (Harmel and Janda 1994). Hence, a policy-motivated
party changes if it fails to achieve its policy goals and an office-motivated
party changes if it fails to achieve its office goals. This failure empowers
different groups with different goals. For example, if party activists set party
policy too far away from the median voter, the party risks losing votes and
not being invited to join a coalition government. Hence, activists set a
radical agenda for policy reasons, but as a consequence the party is unable
to enact these policies because it is excluded from power. Continued
exclusion from office forces activists to change strategy or it disgraces them
altogether. In both cases, a more office-motivated strategy is chosen, either
by activists now willing to compromise or by a party leadership that was
able to win back power. By employing office-motivated strategies, formerly
policy-motivated parties now behave according to Hypothesis 2. This
transition is Hypothesis 3.
Hypothesis 3: Policy-motivated parties change into office-motivated






































To test the hypotheses, I compare seven social democratic parties
(Labour, PS, PSOE, PvdA, SAP, SD and SPD) in the period 1980–
2005. Because I analyse government policy, the unit of analysis is social
democratic government terms. I analyse the whole term to evaluate the
sum of expansionary and regressive welfare state measures taken and by
doing so get the general picture of social democratic policy choices. The
analysis is based on a qualitative comparison of existing data sources and
literature. For reasons of space I only use key references for the
description of the data and the case studies. Other sources that were
consulted as well as coding decisions are listed in a web appendix on the
author’s website.
Data
The article’s dependent variable is the enactment of welfare state policies by
social democrats in government. This is defined as changes in the regulation
of employment, via job protection or active labour market policies and
changes in the level, eligibility criteria and duration of unemployment
benefits. Researchers have coded whether retrenchment (lower, shorter or
fewer benefits; less protection) has taken place or readjustment or expansion
(Clasen 2005; Clasen and Clegg 2007; Green-Pedersen 2002; Mato 2011;
Sjöberg 2011; van Gerven 2008).
To measure the (shifts in) intra-party balance of power I combine
different party organisation variables from the literature (Bille 2001;
Kitschelt 1994; Poguntke 2002) to make a time-variant index. The variables
are member/voter (m/v) ratios, formal linkages with labour unions,
centralisation of candidate selection and the formal and informal existence
of a left-wing faction in the party. The variables are divided into four
categories. Summing the party scores on the four variables gives an index of
4 (extreme policy-seeking) to 16 (extreme office-seeking).
The four variables are selected because they measure different aspects of
the intra-party balance of power between activists and leaders. First, the
member/voter ratio is a measure of membership density, indicating the
party’s degree of linkage with the membership organisation (Poguntke
2002). The more members a party has proportional to its number of voters
the more a party is penetrated by members. Since the proportion of active
party members compared to passive party members is rather constant
across parties and time (Poguntke 2002), the more members a party has the
more activists it has. By using four ordinal categories of the member/voter
ratio rather than the rough number of member/voter ratio, I circumvent
problems with changes in the member/voter ratio due to changes in a
party’s electoral performance. Second, union linkage indicates the degree
to which unions can control or influence parties. With overlapping




































membership and intra-party decision-making power, unions can veto
proposals they disagree with. Third, the degree of centralisation in
candidate selection determines the degree of independence party leaders
have vis-à-vis the party organisation. In centralised parties, party leaders
decide on their own re-election, but in decentralised parties, party leaders
need support from the rank-and-file (Bille 2001). Fourth, the presence or
absence of formal or informal left-wing factions hinders the ability of party
leaders to shift to the right (Kitschelt 1994). Such policy shifts can be
vetoed by left-wing factions represented in the parliamentary group, party
membership organisation or even by the party leadership. The absence of
such groups makes the party leadership more flexible.
To analyse whether parties failed to obtain their policy goals I take data
on exclusion from government participation from the government party
dataset (Woldendorp et al. 2000). This variable is labelled as failure.
Credible opposition is defined in terms of unions being effective in mobilis-
ing opposition against retrenchment measures and the strategic behaviour of
pro-welfare opposition parties (i.e. socialist and Christian democratic
parties). I use historical descriptions of reform efforts to determine whether
such events took place (for sources used in this variable and all others see web
appendix on author’s website: www.gijsschumacher.nl). This was coded as
strong, weak or absent mobilisation. To operationalise changes in the eco-
nomy, I look at changes in inflation and unemployment using OECD data
(2011). Changes in inflation and unemployment are key economic conditions
that motivate people to cast an economic vote against the government (Duch
and Stevenson 2008; Erikson et al. 2002). In the analysis, economic conditions
are coded as þ (inflation and unemployment going down in comparison to
previous year), þ/– (inflation or unemployment going down, and the other
going up), – (both are going up).
Case Selection
I selected seven social democratic parties (SD, SPD, PS, PvdA, PSOE, SAP
and Labour, see Table 1) to cover meaningful variation in the variable of
interest, party organisation. Table 2 shows the scores of each party on the
intra-party balance of power index in 1980 with the PSOE and PS as the
most office-seeking parties.
5
SPD and SAP are examples of parties in
between office-seeking and policy-seeking. SAP is strongly centralised but
also has strong union linkages. The SPD is regionally and ideologically
fragmented and is therefore characterised by shifting balances of power
between groups of activists and groups of leaders. The combination of party
organisation characteristics made the PvdA, SD and Labour the parties
most geared towards policy-seeking strategies in the 1980s. In conclusion,
the sample varies between strong office-seeking, strong policy-seeking and in


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3 compares the PS and PSOE, the parties expected to choose an office-
motivated strategy. Before 1981 and 1982 respectively, the PS and PSOE
followed a radical opposition strategy, promising a ‘rupture’ with
capitalism. When in government the PS initially undertook a radical
expansion of government responsibilities. However, Spain and France
experienced strong increases in unemployment and inflation in the early
1980s. This led both parties to abandon their initial radicalism. The volte-
face of the PS came in 1983, rejecting Keynesianism and imposing austerity
measures and market-oriented policies (Bell 2003). In terms of welfare
policies, the PS reduced eligibility to benefits for workers with short
contributory periods (Clasen and Clegg 2007). This U-turn elicited criticism
TABLE 2
SEVEN SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTIES (1980–2010), THE INITIAL INTRA-PARTY
BALANCE OF POWER (1980) ORDERED BY DEGREE OF OFFICE-SEEKING TO
POLICY-SEEKING








Spain PSOE Very low Very weak Centralised Weak 14
France PS Very low Very weak Decentralised Strong 12
In-between cases
Sweden SAP High Very strong Centralised Weak 9
Germany SDP High Weak Decentralised Strong 9
Policy-seeking parties
Netherlands PvdA Low Weak Strongly decentralised Very strong 8
Denmark SD Very high Very strong Decentralised Weak 7
UK Labour Low Very strong Strongly decentralised Very strong 6
BoP ¼ Intra-party balance of power.
TABLE 3
OFFICE-SEEKING SOCIAL DEMOCRATS
Dep. variable Independent variables
Party Period Retrenchment BoP Economy Opposition Hyp
PSOE 82–86 Yes 14 7 Absent H2
PSOE 86–89 No 15 þ Weak H2
PSOE 89–93 Yes 15 7 Absent H2
PSOE 93–96 No 15 þ Absent H2
PS 81–86 Yes 12 7 Weak H2
PS 88–93 Yes 12 þ/7 Strong *H2
PS 97–02 No 12 þ Strong H2
H2: Retrenchment if opposition and economy is weak.






































both internally and from the Communist Party (PCF). Yet President
Mitterrand effectively quelled internal opposition by stressing the need for
party unity in government (Bell 2003). In addition, the PCF was much less
of a threat, because the PS enjoyed an absolute majority in parliament and
the PCF had ceased to be a national competitor of the PS (Kitschelt 1994).
Much like the PS, the PSOE flexibilised part-time labour contracts in 1984
(Gutiérrez and Guillén 2000). With weak unions and a disparate
Communist Party (PCE), effective mobilisation against these measures
failed to materialise and therefore the PSOE leadership did not face electoral
reprisals from a credible opposition. Because these office-motivated parties
retrench when the economy is underperforming and in the absence of a
credible opposition, I find evidence for Hypothesis 2. This is not to say that
these parties became neoliberal outfits: they responded pragmatically to
environmental incentives. For example, under better economic conditions in
1988, the PSOE extended the duration of unemployment benefits and
unemployment assistance (Mato 2011).
Yet in 1992 and 1993 the economic tide changed for the worse and
increasing pressures to live up to the newly defined EMU criteria motivated
the PSOE and PS to cut. The PSOE decreased the duration and level of
unemployment benefits and implemented stricter eligibility criteria (Mato
2011). The PS implemented similar, less radical, measures in 1992 and 1993
(Clasen and Clegg 2007). The weak Spanish unions and United Left party
(IU) were unable to muster support against the measures and therefore the
PSOE did not fear electoral reprisals (Gutiérrez and Guillén 2000). The PS
was bereft of the majority it had between 1981 and 1986. Facing criticism
from the left, the PS cooperated with the centrist UDF to push through the
measures. Yet the PS probably miscalculated because it lost a staggering 217
seats (out of 260) at the 1993 elections. This provides weak support for
Hypothesis 2.
In two later periods the PS (1997–2001) and the PSOE (1993–1996) did
not push for significant cuts in the welfare state. The main reason is that
sound economic performance reduced the risk of economic voting against
the government. As such, there was no rationale for retrenchment.
Office-motivated parties are responsive to the economy and public
opinion, because they anticipate future electoral reprisals via the economic
vote and update their position before ending up in opposition. Yet when the
economy is healthy, retrenchment is off the table. The cases of the PSOE and
the PS largely verify this hypothesis (H2).
Policy-motivated Parties
Labour, PvdA and SD are expected to employ policy-seeking strategies
(see Table 1). All three countries experienced high unemployment, high
inflation and huge budget deficits in the early 1980s. As predicted by
Hypothesis 1, these policy-seeking social democrats came up with a radical




































response to the crisis. Under pressure from young, ideologically motivated
activists in the early 1970s all three parties had already shifted to the left.
6
The economic troubles of the late 1970s and early 1980s placed welfare
issues even higher up the agenda. In the 1981 elections, the PvdA
increased its emphasis on the decommodification of welfare and proposed
a radical regulation of minimum and maximum income (Marx and
Schumacher forthcoming). The SD issued more statements about welfare
state expansion, especially when the right-wing Schlüter government
attempted to reform the welfare state (Nygard 2006). At the start of the
1980s, both parties were briefly in government but did not enact welfare
cuts. The Labour Party shifted to a radical socialist programme in the
early 1980s, exemplified by their far-left The New Hope for Britain 1983
election manifesto (Kitschelt 1994).
The PvdA and the SD did win votes in elections in the early 1980s, but
centre and centre-right parties refused to cooperate and therefore they
experienced long periods of exclusion from office. Labour experienced
dramatic defeats by the Conservatives from 1979 to 1992.
As Table 4 demonstrates, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, exclusion from
office brought about party organisational changes that shifted the intra-
party balance of power in all three cases. By shifting decision-making on
candidate selection, leadership selection and manifesto formulation from
local delegates to ordinary members in a series of reforms between 1987 and
1993, the Labour Party leadership centralised power, eradicated militant
tendencies and paved the way for ideological change (Seyd 1999). Similarly,
the PvdA (1991) and the SD (1992) reduced activist influence by introducing
TABLE 4
INITIALLY (1980S) POLICY-SEEKING SOCIAL DEMOCRATS
Dep. Variable Independent variables
Party Period Retrenchment BoP Economy Opposition Failure? Hyp
PvdA 81–82 No 8 7 Weak No H1
PvdA 89–94 Yes 10 þ/7 Weak Yes H2
PvdA 94–98 Yes 13 þ Weak No *H2
PvdA 98–02 No 13 þ Weak No H2
SD 79–81 No 8 7 Strong No H1
SD 81–84 No 7 þ Strong No H1
SD 93–94 Yes 9 7 Weak Yes H2/H3
SD 94–98 Yes 10 þ Weak No *H2
SD 98–01 Yes 11.5 þ/7 Weak No H2
Labour 76–79 No 7 7 Strong No H1
Labour 97–01 Yes 11 þ Weak Yes *H2/H3
Labour 01–05 No 11 þ Weak No H2
H1: No retrenchment if intra-party balance of power (BoP) is low.
H2: Retrenchment if economy and opposition is weak.
H3: Increase intra-party balance of power (BoP) due to failure to achieve policy goals
(Failure?).






































election mechanisms in which the power of activists was mitigated (Marx
and Schumacher forthcoming). The system of dual union SD membership
was abolished in the late 1980s and the representation of unions in SD
executive organs ended in 1995 (Allern et al. 2007). In sum, activists had
fewer means with which to obstruct party leaders.
After changes in the intra-party balance of power, all three parties
changed their ideology and policies. In the 1997 elections, Labour’s Third
Way offered active labour market policies, reduction of passive welfare
measures and flexibilisation of labour contracts (Green-Pedersen et al. 2001).
The SD and PvdA were Third Way avant la lettre. In the 1994 elections, the
SD issued fewer statements about welfare state expansion and more about
market orientation (Nygard 2006). In the 1994 elections, the PvdA shifted
dramatically to the right (Schumacher 2012). These ideological shifts secured
acceptance by the centre and all three parties came back to government. In
policy terms, Labour (1999), SD (1993, 1995, 1998) and the PvdA (1991, 1992,
1994) took measures that reduced the duration and number of people eligible
for unemployment benefits, made receipt conditional on participation in
activation programmes and in the latter two cases, relaxed labour market
regulations for part-timers (Green-Pedersen 2002; van Gerven 2008).
In conclusion, the three policy-motivated parties did not moderate their
policies as a response to poor economic conditions (H1), but the absence of
government participation that the choice of radical policies brought ultimately
triggered party change (H3). Although party change enabled leaders to dictate
the party’s agenda, immediate economic conditions were not in all cases
responsible for the party’s adoption of welfare state retrenchment. Halfway
through the 1990s the Danish, Dutch and British economies were not doing
badly compared to the 1980s. Yet these parties enacted retrenchment (*H2).
One alternative explanation is that it took longer for parties to change. Being
framed as the ‘Loony Left’ in the 1980s, these social democratic parties had to
prove their capabilities in macroeconomic management. However, party
change is a slow process, especially when activists are strongly embedded in
the organisation. Possibly, many of the policies these parties implemented
were conceived in a time of economic hardship, but were only adopted as the
new dogma after the slow process of breaking intra-party opposition.
In Between Policy Motivations and Office Motivations
SAP and SPD are cases in between policy motivations and office
motivations. In 1982, the SAP experienced its first period (1976–1982) out
of office since 1936 and an internal SAP report blamed this on the fact that
voters associated the rigid bureaucracy of the welfare state with the SAP
(Klitgaard 2007). Consequently, the SAP’s 1982 election manifesto saw a
sharp decline in statements about welfare state expansion and an increase in
statements about welfare state limitation (Nygard 2006). This was branded
as a Swedish ‘Third Way’ between Thatcherite neoliberalism and French




































expansionism (Pontusson 1987) and was visible in some new policy
measures such as the liberalisation of financial markets. But the party did
not change its posture vis-à-vis the welfare state (Pontusson 1992). A new
welfare reform package bringing more freedom of choice in the welfare state
was proposed, yet it was never introduced (Klitgaard 2007). The SAP
remained on a traditional social democratic path and the comparatively
buoyant economy of the 1980s did not motivate the SAP to take risky
measures such as welfare state retrenchment. When inflation was sky-
rocketing between 1989 and 1991, however, the SAP did introduce austerity
measures and increasingly sought policy inspiration from right-wing parties
(Pontusson 1992). But the dramatic electoral defeat of 1991 ended
retrenchment experiments.
After being excluded from office between 1991 and 1994, the SAP
undertook a change of strategy in the 1994 elections. In its election
manifesto there were far fewer statements about welfare state expansion and
many more about the market economy (Nygard 2006). Once it returned to
government in 1994, the SAP cut back on social policies in order to decrease
the budget deficit. Between 1994 and 1997, it tightened eligibility criteria and
reduced benefit levels (Anderson 2001). However, the SAP reversed the
benefit cut and shelved plans for a time limit on benefits (Anderson 2001),
because it came into conflict with the Swedish labour union (LO), which had
relatively strong links with the SAP (Allern et al. 2007). Also, by 1998 the
budget deficit had disappeared and SAP no longer pushed for welfare state
reform (Sjöberg 2011). Hence, the SAP discontinued retrenchment plans
because of a considerable risk of losing votes due to opposition mobilisation
(H2). Nor did the SAP’s success (it remained in office until 2006) incentivise
the party to change. Therefore, the path of the SAP gives weak evidence for
both Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 (see Table 5). This is because the union
is both connected to SAP and a strong player externally. Hence, it can
mobilise both party activists and public opinion.
The SPD was removed from office in 1982 and was unable to stage a
come-back until 1998. Throughout this period, modernisers (welfare reform)
and traditionalists (no welfare reform) debated the party’s course. With a
strong pro-welfare government party (CDU) the SPD had little to gain
electorally from shifting to the right; consequently, the interests of the
leaders and the activists converged on maintaining a traditional social
democratic course.
In contrast to Hypothesis 3, the SPD’s long period in the dark did not
radically change the party (see Table 5). Instead, it experienced an almost
perpetually shifting leadership (Meyer 1999). In the 1998 elections, the dual
leadership of party chairman Oskar Lafontaine (traditionalist) and
chancellor-candidate Gerhard Schröder (modernist) appealed to contra-
dictory political demands and was electorally successful (Picot 2009).
The initial approach to the welfare state under Schröder reflected the





































demise of Lafontaine strengthened the modernist wing at the expense of left-
wing factions within the SPD. With an economic downturn in 2001,
Schröder gave the green light for the infamous Hartz-IV reforms, which
decreased the duration of unemployment benefits, made fewer people
eligible for these benefits and attached activation conditions to them (Clasen
2005). Because the pro-welfare party CDU agreed with the reforms,
Schröder believed he had effectively muffled any credible opposition.
But the strategy backfired after the reforms were enacted. SPD
traditionalists and the unions felt cheated. In response, the far left ‘Die
Linke’ emerged, promising to revoke the ‘neoliberal’ Hartz-IV reforms, and
stealing away many SPD voters in the 2005 elections, which contributed to
the downfall of the Schröder II cabinet. The success of ‘Die Linke’ was an
immediate feedback effect of the Hartz-IV reforms.
In sum, as in between office-motivated and policy-motivated parties, the
SAP and SPD experienced drawn-out debates in the 1980s without a clear
conclusion. In both cases, a small window of opportunity for retrenchment
opened up, but was quickly closed by the mobilisation of a credible
opposition in the shape of rival parties or unions. As such, the SPD and
SAP remain much more committed to a more traditional social democratic
programme than all other parties in the sample.
Conclusion
The analysis of seven social democratic parties in the period 1980–2005
demonstrates that party responsiveness depends on the intra-party balance
of power. Parties in which activists were dominant (SD, Labour and PvdA)
TABLE 5
PATH OF SOCIAL DEMOCRATS BETWEEN OFFICE-SEEKING AND
POLICY-SEEKING
Dep. Variable Independent variables
Party Period Retrenchment BoP Economy Opposition Failure? Hyp
SAP 82–85 No 9 þ Strong No (h1/h2)
SAP 85–88 No 9 þ Strong No (h1/h2)
SAP 88–91 No 10 7 Strong No (h1/h2)
SAP 94–98 Yes 10 7 Strong No (h2)
SAP 98–02 No 10 þ Strong No (h1/h2)
SAP 02–06 No 10 þ Strong No (h1/h2)
SDP 80–83 No 9 7 Strong No (h1/h2)
SDP 98–02 Yes 10 þ/7 Weak Yes (h2/h3)
SDP 02–05 Yes 11 7 Weak No H2
H1: No retrenchment if intra-party balance of power (BoP) is low.
H2: Retrenchment if economy and opposition is weak.
H3: Increase intra-party balance of power (BoP) due to failure to achieve policy goals
(Failure?).
H ¼ confirmation hypothesis, (h) ¼ weak support for hypothesis, *H ¼ rejection of
hypothesis.




































initially responded to the economic crisis in the early 1980s with a radical
agenda (H1). This is in contrast with parties in which party leaders were
dominant (PS and PSOE). These parties were quick to adopt pragmatic,
centrist policies including welfare state retrenchment and labour market
flexibilisation. This strategy secured their electoral profile in the short term
(H2). Parties with a radical response were not able to replicate that success.
They were excluded from office for most of the 1980s and early 1990s. As a
consequence of party failure, leaders reduced the power of party activists,
which enabled a more pragmatic course of action and a return to power. In
power, these social democrats enacted retrenchment measures as well (H3).
This article contributes to the welfare state literature by showing the
variation in party responses to similar conditions. The quantitative welfare
state literature usually assumes that welfare state change is explained by
economic and political conditions in the year prior to the change (e.g. Allan
and Scruggs 2004; Huber and Stephens 2001; Iversen and Cusack 2000;
Swank 2005). This paper demonstrates that the hypothesised positive effect
of an increase in, for example, unemployment or of a left-wing incumbent is
conditional upon the intra-party balance of power of the governing parties.
The controversy in this literature over whether parties matter is a question
of when parties matter (Schmidt 1996). This paper demonstrates that it is
not partisanship or the economy that explain welfare state change. Both are
important and their impact is dependent on the intra-party balance of
power. The qualitative welfare state literature has engaged with policy-
seeking or office-seeking logics (Green-Pedersen 2002; Kitschelt 2001;
Zohlnhöfer 2003), but has so far concentrated on the electoral calculations
of party leaders, thereby neglecting intra-party dynamics. The examples of
the Dutch, British and Danish social democratic parties in the 1980s
demonstrate that party leaders may have been concerned with electoral
performance, but were forced to pursue a radical and self-defeating agenda.
To stay party leader one must first secure standing within the party before
entry to the office of prime minister or its equivalent can be achieved.
Variation in the difficulties faced by leaders in attaining this standing
explains which strategies parties adopt and the subsequent policy choices
they make.
Notes
1. Welfare state policies include more programmes, such as pensions and sickness
programmes. Old age and health are life course risks, whereas unemployment or poverty
are class risks. Reducing life courses risks is more risky because voters are affected more by
life course risks than by class risks. Social democrats differ from Christian democrats in their
support for measures reducing class risks. Because reducing class risks is a typical social
democratic set of policies, this paper concentrates on the retrenchment of such measures.
2. A credible opposition has catered to working-class voters in the past, by supporting the






































3. Votes are only instrumental in obtaining office or implementing policy. Hence, I consider
vote-seeking behaviour as part of office-seeking.
4. The hypothesis that office-motivated parties change into policy-motivated parties is left out
because it is not empirically observed in this research project.
5. The factionalism that characterises the PS also enabled party leaders like Mitterrand to
manipulate the party by forming flexible intra-party coalitions (Kitschelt 1994).
6. This influenced the decision in all three parties to introduce participatory mechanisms,
shifting power from leaders to activists.
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